Tag Archive: mechanism design

Arrived in Jerusalem on June 30, so missed the first part. This year’s topic is not exactly my research field, but the lectures are all great! 🙂 Everything is familiar here, recovering my happy memory when I first attended the summer school in 2014.

Classmates are very smart and friendly. They have many nice insights and are good conversationalists. I have so many things to learn from them 🙂 To my great delight, there are a small group of attendants doing research on matching, market design, and behavioral economics 🙂

Recorded lectures: https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PLTn74Qx5mPsRGmbUg8id_62BPv7ZMUQhl

Program website: http://www.as.huji.ac.il/content/28th-jerusalem-school-economic-theory

2017-06-15 15_59_13-Mechanism Design Economic School 2017.pdf - PDF Complete



Enjoyed the beautiful Chicago summer!!

Frontiers of Economic Theory and Computer Science

August 12–13, 2016

Saieh Hall for Economics, Room 021

With the advent of the internet economy, there has been a remarkable convergence in lines of inquiry between the fields of economic theory and computer science. The emergence of new markets mediated by information technology has spurred new research on how strategic agents interact with complex institutions, and also on how best to design institutions in the face of limited information and limited computational resources. The disciplines of game theory and complexity theory provide complementary approaches to understanding these issues. This conference brings together leading researchers from these fields to share and discuss exciting new developments. The broader goal is to facilitate a dialogue on how best to advance the common objective of understanding strategic behavior and institutional design in complex environments.




Friday, August 12

Auctions and Pricing in Markets with Complex Constraints
Stanford University
Discussant: Tim Roughgarden
Combinatorial Auctions via Posted Prices
Blavatnik School of Computer Science at Tel-Aviv University
Perfect Competition in Markets with Adverse Selection
University of Pennsylvania
Games of Incomplete Information Played By Statisticians
Microsoft Research
Discussant: Vasilis Syrgkanis
Multi-dimensional Virtual Values and Second Degree Price Discrimination
Pennsylvania State University
Learning and Efficiency in Games with Dynamic Population
Cornell University

Saturday, August 13

Strong Duality for a Multiple-Good Monopolist
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Motivational Ratings
Stanford University
Game Abstractions for Counterfactual Predictions in Online Market
Facebook, Inc.
Information Design
Princeton University
Affirmative Action in Assignment Mechanisms
Massachusetts Institute of Technology

It’s really great to go back to Peking University 🙂

Here is the link of the news  (updated on June 30): http://www.econ.pku.edu.cn/displaynews.php?id=101395

Conference Agenda

June 25 – 26, 2016

Room 307, School of Economics, Peking University

Organizers: Xuezheng Qin and Qingmin Liu

Sponsor: School of Economics, Peking University

June 25 (Saturday)

08:00 – 08:30 Registration

08:30 – 08:45 Welcome Speech

Qixiang Sun, Professor and Dean, School of Economics at PKU

08:45 – 09:45 Xi Weng (Peking University):

“A Theory of Organizational Dynamics: Internal Politics and Efficiency”

(joint with Hongbin Cai and Hong Feng)

09:45 – 10:45 Dilip Abreu (Princeton University):

“Bargaining with One‐sided Asymmetric Information under Ideal

Reputational Conditions” (joint work with David Pearce and Ennio


10:45 – 11:05 Photo Session

Venue: Outside the main entrance of SEPKU Building (Ground Floor)

11:05 – 11:25 Coffee Break outside Room 307, SEPKU Building

11:25 – 12:25 Ning Sun (Shanghai University of Economics and Finance)

“A Theory of Marriage with Mutually Consented Divorces”

12:25 – 14:00 Lunch in Room B103 (Underground level 1 of SEPKU Building)

14:00 – 15:00 Xianwen Shi (University of Toronto):

“The Dimensions of Consensus” (joint with Alex Gershkov and Benny


15:00 – 16:00 Wing Suen (Hong Kong University):

Competition for Attention in the News Media Market(joint with

Heng Chen)

16:00 – 16:20 Coffee Break outside Room 307, SEPKU Building

16:20 – 17:20 Felix Kübler (University of Zurich):

The identification of beliefs from asset demand(joint with Herakles


18:30 – 20:30 Reception Dinner (by invitation only)

Venue: ZHILIHUIGUAN Restaurant

June 26 (Sunday)

09:00 – 10:00 Zenan Wu (Peking University):

“Managerial Turnover and Entrenchment” (joint with Xi Weng)

10:00 – 11:00 Sylvain Chassang (Princeton University):


11:00 – 11:20 Coffee Break outside Room 307, SEPKU Building

11:20 – 12:20 Tilman Börgers (University of Michigan):

“Revealed Relative Utilitarianism” (joint with Yan-Min Choo)

12:20 – 14:00 Lunch in Room B103 (Underground level 1 of SEPKU Building)

14:00 – 15:00 Qingmin Liu (Columbia University):

“Auctions with Limited Commitment” (joint with Konrad Mierendorff

and Xianwen Shi)

15:00 – 16:00 Jimmy Chan (Fudan University):

“Fiscal Receipt Lottery”

16:00 – 16:20 Coffee Break outside Room 307, SEPKU Building

16:20 – 17:20 Cheng Sun (Peking University):

Reputation and Social Media

Conference Photo - PKU Summer Conference on Microeconomic Theory