Tag Archive: education



It would be my first time to visit Michigan. Really look forward to it!

Session 2-4: Education issues

Venue: West 3
Chair: Di Mo, Stanford University
1. China’s Brain Drain: Reassessing Kwok and Leland’s Economic Model, Chen Fang. University of Colorado Denver

2. Teacher Incentives: Eyeglasses or Blackboard? Yiwei Qian. University of Southern California

3. Peer Effect Heterogeneity in Computer Assisted Learning: Evidence from a Randomized Experiment, Di Mo. Stanford University and University of Leuven

4. From Sequential to Parallel Mechanism: Interactions of Centralized College Recruitment and Early Admission, Yuqing Hu. The World Bank

5. Sorting, School Performance and Quality: Evidence from China, Yang Song. University of Pittsburgh

In this review report, I will summarize Neal and Schanzenbach’s paper based on my presentation on April 18, and I will highlight some points that we discussed in class. My review proceeds according to the following outline:

  1. Research Question and Main Results
  2. Literature and Contribution of this Paper
  3. Theoretical Model
  4. Research Context and Data
  5. Empirical Strategy
  6. Result Summary
  7. Policy Implications

Slides: Left Behind by Design

Written Review: Written Review-Neal and Schanzenbach 2010 Left Behind by Desigh

In this review report, I will summarize Jepsen and Rivikin’s paper based on my presentation on February 7, and I will highlight some of the points based on the comments made in our discussion. My review proceeds according to the following outline:

  1. Background and motivation
  2. Research question and main results
  3. Relation with literature
  4. Empirical model
  5. Data and descriptive results
  6. Analytical results
  7. Conclusion and policy implications

Slides here;

Review on Jepsen and Rivikin;

Econ 206 Term Paper, finally done!!! Thank Prof. Kibris and Prof. Becker!

Abstract: Pre-exam recruitment (PER) self-arranged by colleges in China is the alternative admission method outside the centralized National College Entrance Examination (NCEE) System, and it has become increasingly prevalent among colleges over the recent years. We attribute this rapid spread of PER to the reform of the admission policy which renders the admission mechanism vulnerable to college manipulation. The former “sequential mechanism” is equivalent to Boston mechanism, and it is not strategy-proof for students or colleges. Under that old mechanism, students strategize in a sophisticated level that leaves no incentive for colleges to manipulate, since the overall space for Pareto improvement is limited. The reform brings about the “parallel mechanism”, which generates the matchings that are equivalent to both the student-optimal and college-optimal deferred acceptance algorithm under the acyclic priority structure. Since students can only submit a fixed length of preference list in the application, this new mechanism is strategy-proof for them. However, it is manipulable for individual colleges because PER allows them to reallocate their type specific quotas. Colleges can reduce the quality gap between different types of students, so as to improve the overall qualities of students admitted. However, unlike the manipulation under the inefficient “sequential mechanism”, the “parallel mechanism” which is college optimal has no space for Pareto improvement for all the colleges as a whole. Under this mechanism, individual college benefits themselves at the expense of hurting other colleges, but some students of cyclic preferences strictly benefits from PER as they are able to attend their more favorable colleges. In equilibrium, all the colleges participate in PER and allocate their quotas in accordance with the distributions of students across types. However, this equilibrium is unattainable as the proportion of capacities set aside for PER can never be 100% under the existing education policy. Colleges thus keep enlarging this proportion as a response of other colleges’ PER, and this may partly explain why we observe the increasing prevalence of PER.