Category: Computer Science


My last week in Israel before I come back to Beijing 🙂

https://sites.google.com/site/igtconf2017/

Program

Talks and coffee breaks are in Dan David 001
Dinner and lunches are in Gan Hadkalim (in front of exact sciences building). 
 
Monday, July 10, 2017
 
10:10 — 10:20    Coffee
10:30 — 11:00     Adam Kalai                        Unambiguous communication without a common prior
11:00 — 11:30    Éva Tardos
11:30 — 11:50     Coffee break
11:50 — 12:20     Moshe Tennenholtz        A Game Theoretic Approach to Information Retrieval
12:20 — 12:50    Ariel Rubinstein              Multi-dimensional Reasoning in Games: Framework, Equilibrium and Applications
13:00 — 14:30    Lunch break
14:30 — 15:00    Yuval Salant                   Statistical Inference in Games
15:00 — 15:30    Georgy Egorov               Strategic Communication with Minimal Verification 
15:30 — 16:00    Peter Klibanoff                Incomplete Information Games with Ambiguity Averse Players
16:00 — 16:20    Coffee break
16:20 — 16:50    Peyton Young                 Games, Norms, and Institutions
16:50 — 17:20    David Schmeidler           Desirability
17:20 — 17:50    Robert Aumann              My Ehud
18:30                 Dinner
 
 
Tuesday, July 11, 2017
 
10:10 — 10:20    Coffee
10:30 — 11:00    Tim Roughgarden          On a Theorem of Kalai and Samet
11:00 — 11:30    Michal Feldman              Prophet Inequalities Made Easy: Stochastic Optimization by Pricing Non-Stochastic Inputs
11:30 — 11:50    Coffee break
11:50 — 12:20    Abraham Neyman          Cooperative Strategic Games
12:20 — 12:50    Rann Smorodinsky         Bayesian Learning in Markets with Common Value
13:00 — 14:30    Lunch break
14:30 — 15:00    Leeat Yariv
15:00 — 15:30    Johannes Hörner
15:30 — 16:00    Jonathan Weinstein        Complementarity Revisited
16:00                 Coffee
 
Wednesday, July 12, 2017
 
10:10 — 10:20    Coffee
10:30 — 11:00    Paul Milgrom                    Economics and Computer Science of a Radio Spectrum Reallocation
11:00 — 11:30    TBA, Microsoft Research
11:30 — 11:50    Coffee break
11:50 — 12:20    Rakesh Vohra
12:20 — 12:50    Noam Nisan
13:00 — 14:30    Lunch break
14:30 — 15:00    Yair Tauman                    Coordination games with unknown outside options
15:00 — 15:30    Dov Samet
15:30 — 16:00    Chaim Fershtman           The Competitive Effects of Information Sharing
16:00 — 16:20    Coffee break
16:20 — 16:50    Ehud Lehrer
16:50 — 17:20    Ehud Kalai
17:30                 Reception
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Workshop website: http://marketplaceinnovation.net/

It was such a nice stay at Stanford! Thanks for all the feedback 🙂

Yuqing Hu - 1

 

Enjoyed the beautiful Chicago summer!!

Frontiers of Economic Theory and Computer Science

August 12–13, 2016

Saieh Hall for Economics, Room 021
ORGANIZERS
BENJAMIN BROOKS, UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO
MOHAMMAD AKBARPOUR, UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

With the advent of the internet economy, there has been a remarkable convergence in lines of inquiry between the fields of economic theory and computer science. The emergence of new markets mediated by information technology has spurred new research on how strategic agents interact with complex institutions, and also on how best to design institutions in the face of limited information and limited computational resources. The disciplines of game theory and complexity theory provide complementary approaches to understanding these issues. This conference brings together leading researchers from these fields to share and discuss exciting new developments. The broader goal is to facilitate a dialogue on how best to advance the common objective of understanding strategic behavior and institutional design in complex environments.

 

 

Program

Friday, August 12

Auctions and Pricing in Markets with Complex Constraints
Stanford University
Discussant: Tim Roughgarden
Combinatorial Auctions via Posted Prices
Blavatnik School of Computer Science at Tel-Aviv University
Perfect Competition in Markets with Adverse Selection
University of Pennsylvania
Games of Incomplete Information Played By Statisticians
Microsoft Research
Discussant: Vasilis Syrgkanis
Multi-dimensional Virtual Values and Second Degree Price Discrimination
Pennsylvania State University
Learning and Efficiency in Games with Dynamic Population
Cornell University

Saturday, August 13

Strong Duality for a Multiple-Good Monopolist
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Break
Motivational Ratings
Stanford University
Game Abstractions for Counterfactual Predictions in Online Market
Facebook, Inc.
Information Design
Princeton University
Affirmative Action in Assignment Mechanisms
Massachusetts Institute of Technology